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Call for Papers

The Indian Journal of International Economic Law (“IJIEL”) invites submissions for the upcoming Volume 17(2)Special Issue of its Journal, dealing with Digital Competition Regulation and International Economic Law.

Vision for the Issue

Digital markets have become a focal point for new competition regulation, with policymakers worldwide exhibiting a strong regulatory impulse to rein in the dominance of “Big Tech” through ex ante rules. This is exemplified by regimes like the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and similar proposals (e.g. India’s draft Digital Competition Bill identifying Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs)). These frameworks impose upfront obligations on designated digital “gatekeepers” to prevent anti-competitive practices before they occur. However, this regulatory impulse to assert domestic control over digital competition exists in tension with the countervailing trade welfare impulse which underpins international economic law. International economic law (IEL), epitomized in trade and investment agreements, emphasizes open markets and non-discrimination to maximize trade-driven welfare, and it tends to view sweeping regulatory measures with caution. This is because unilateral ex-ante regulation of international digital platforms allows domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over them, fragmenting markets, creating regulatory asymmetries, and imposing trade-restrictive effects that extend beyond national borders. The emerging interface between digital competition law and IEL is therefore fraught with friction: what competition authorities hail as prudent market oversight can be perceived by trading partners as protectionist encroachment. Indeed, some states are already framing these new digital competition obligations as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. For example, the United States has voiced concerns that the DMA’s restrictive provisions unfairly target foreign (particularly U.S.) firms, potentially making it a “disguised” trade barrier rather than a neutral competition tool. This encapsulates the core issue: the push to regulate digital markets for legitimate domestic objectives may collide with commitments under IEL, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, creating a need to carefully navigate between regulatory sovereignty and trade obligations.

This research is significant because it addresses a timely and growing tension at the heart of international economic governance. One concern, for instance, is the principle of non-discrimination. IEL (for instance, the General Agreement on Trade in Services clause on Most-Favored-Nation or MFN) obligates countries to ensure no less favorable treatment than that given to any other country’s or one’s own like services. Yet many digital competition laws, while written in ostensibly neutral terms, have disproportionate impacts on foreign tech giants. For instance, the DMA’s criteria for “gatekeeper” designation (high global revenue, large EU user base) have so far been met almost exclusively by U.S-based firms, with few if any EU-headquartered companies in scope. This raises the specter of de facto discrimination: even if the rules are impartial on the face of it, their effect is to single out firms for heavy regulatory burdens. Such outcomes can be interpreted as violations of WTO non-discrimination obligations, with some arguing that applying uniform thresholds which catch only foreign players “modifies conditions of competition” to the detriment of those foreign firms, favoring domestic rivals. Moreover, MFN treatment concerns come into play when firms from certain countries bear the brunt of these regulations while “like” services from other countries escape. For example, if a U.S. platform is designated a gatekeeper but a similarly situated competitor from another country is not because it falls just shy of the threshold, this could be seen as according less favorable treatment to one WTO member’s service over another’s. The fact that regulatory obligations designed to curb Big Tech’s market power are being cast as NTBs and potential trade agreement violations underscores the high stakes of this interface. Unaddressed, these tensions could lead to international trade disputes, undermine the effectiveness of digital competition rules or prompt retaliatory measures that fragment the digital economy. Therefore, a sharper examination of this trade-competition nexus is both academically novel and practically urgent. By doing this, Volume 17(2) seeks to contribute to a growing body of scholarship aimed at interrogating and exploring more coherent approaches which reconcile domestic regulatory autonomy with international economic law obligations.

For more information on the special issue, please refer to our Concept Note here.

Indicative Themes

  • (A) Ex-ante Competition Regimes in a Global Context: Examining the emergence of ex-ante competition laws for digital markets (such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act and similar initiatives) and their implications for international trade norms. This includes exploring how the shift toward preventive regulation interacts with international economic law frameworks that have traditionally been based on ex post enforcement.
  • (B) Digital Competition Regulation and Non-Tariff Barriers: Investigating the fine line between legitimate domestic regulation of digital markets and measures that may constitute non-tariff barriers to trade. Analyses could address how trade agreements and the WTO discipline such regulations, and how governments can pursue competition objectives without imposing unjustifiable restrictions on foreign businesses. Informal and non-institutional mechanisms may also be analyzed.
  • (C) Non-Discrimination (MFN and National Treatment): Assessing whether digital competition rules, often applied to a handful of dominant firms, raise concerns under Most-Favoured-Nation or national treatment obligations. This inquiry could examine instances of de facto discrimination in digital markets and evaluate the scope for reconciling these measures under general exceptions (for instance, public policy) or reimagining them.
  • (D) International Harmonization and Cooperation: Exploring avenues for coordinating digital competition regulations across jurisdictions to minimize conflicts and uncertainty. Topics may include the inclusion of competition provisions in digital trade agreements, the role of international organizations in setting best practices, or proposals for new frameworks to govern platform-centric digital markets.
  • (E) Perspectives of Developing Economies: Examining the challenges and priorities of developing countries in the era of digital platform regulation. This could involve analysis of capacity constraints in implementing new competition rules, detriments (or benefits) of lax competition regulations to encourage foreign trade and investment, the impact of major economies’ regulatory initiatives on smaller markets, and strategies for ensuring that international digital trade rules accommodate diverse developmental needs.

Submission Guidelines

Detailed submission guidelines (along with the process for submission) for the Journal are available here. In brief, we accept submissions that fall within the following categories:

  1. Articles (6,000 to 10,000 words, exclusive of footnotes) – Papers that comprehensively analyse a broad theme in international economic law and engage with relevant debates in existing literature.
  2. Essays (4,000 to 6,000 words, exclusive of footnotes) – Papers that concisely analyse specific contemporary issues in the field of international economic law.
  3. Case Notes and Legislative Commentaries (1,500 to 3,000 words, exclusive of footnotes).

Submission Process

All submissions must be made via the IJIEL Digital Commons Repository. IJIEL does not accept submissions over email. IJIEL endeavours to revert to authors with the first round of editorial review within 4 weeks of submission.

The deadline for submissions is May 8, 2026.

Additional Guidelines

  • Please ensure that your submission is made as a Microsoft Word document (.docx).
  • All manuscripts must be accompanied by a covering letter with the name(s) of the author(s), institution/affiliation, the title of the manuscript, and relevant contact information.
  • Manuscripts should be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 200 words.
  • Co – authorship (of up to 3 authors) is permitted.
  • IJIEL uses the OSCOLA (4th edn) Reference Guide for footnoting.

Contact Details

For any queries and concerns, please contact ijiel.communications@nls.ac.in.