Abstract
Contemporary discourse on democratic decline in India has often emphasised the need for stronger fourth branch institutions to safeguard constitutional democracy. However, fourth branch institutions are marked by a fundamental tension. They are deeply embedded in the very political contexts that they are designed to resist. The operational independence of fourth branch institutions is not merely a function of their design (that is, their structural independence), but also of the political climate, institutional leaders, and informal organisational factors.
Similar design features can produce divergent outcomes across time and contexts, with institutions displaying distinct phases of assertiveness and accommodation. While institutional design may create conditions that facilitate the exercise of independence, it cannot secure or sustain it. The preservation of operational independence further depends on the cultivation of an institutional morality. Sustained efforts by institutional heads to internalise and reproduce norms of accountability and integrity are critical to maintaining independence, particularly in contexts where political power is concentrated in the executive.
Recommended Citation
Ravi, Abhinav
(2025)
"The Indian Fourth Branch: Developing a New Institutional Morality,"
National Law School Journal: Vol. 19:
Iss.
1, Article 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.55496/VQHO3347
Available at:
https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol19/iss1/3
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.55496/VQHO3347
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