Abstract
This article attempts to capture and describe the fundamental tension that now exists in the Indian electoral funding system and considers the issues this tension presents for electoral politics in general. Instead of building a case for, or against, the constitutionality of the Electoral Bonds Scheme, this paper argues that the Electoral Bonds Scheme has created a dystopic system for donations that lends itself to no quick and simple remedy. The Electoral Bonds Scheme poses difficult questions about whether the Parliament can remedy this situation or whether the situation is remediable only by the Supreme Court. To solve this dilemma, Part I deliberates upon the role that money plays in Indian elections and the changes in the relative power of the political parties while campaigning during elections after the introduction of the electoral bonds scheme. Part II outlines and explores how today’s electoral donation system has completely altered the balance of power into favouring the party of the incumbent government. Finally, Part III discusses the dystopic effects of the imbalance of power the Supreme Court has created in the electoral system through its refusal to either adjudicate upon, or grant a stay order, and the barriers to remedying this problematic system by restoring electoral equilibrium.
Recommended Citation
S, Zeenia and Paul, Jehosh
(2019)
"Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Electoral Bonds Scheme for Electoral Donations,"
National Law School Journal: Vol. 15:
Iss.
1, Article 12.
Available at:
https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol15/iss1/12