Abstract
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement, concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, is a particularly ambitious international agreement in that aims to set a common floor for intellectual property protection in all World Trade Organization (WTO) members. Leading developing country governments vigorously resisted the conclusion of the agreement for philosophical and economic reasons, but under heavy pressure from developed country governments eventually accepted it. Despite their objections, almost all developing country governments have taken steps to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, many have done so before they were required to and many adopted more rigorous IPR rules than strictly required by TRIPs. This article seeks to explain this puzzle by testing explanations compliance derived from realism, which emphasizes the importance of great power coercion; neo-liberalism, which stresses coercion, but also the costs associated with reciprocal withdrawal of benefits and a loss of reputation as a reliable partner; and constructivism, which tends to focus on the legitimacy of the international rule. It finds that none of these explanations accounts for the observed variance and argues for closer analysis of the domestic politics of developing countries’ compliance.
Recommended Citation
Winanti, Poppy and Young, Alasdair
(2009)
"Complying with Unwelcome Rules? Developing Countries and the TRIPs Agreement,"
Indian Journal of International Economic Law: Vol. 2, Article 10.
Available at:
https://repository.nls.ac.in/ijiel/vol2/iss1/10