Abstract
Were India to be a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), international law would require it to disarm its nuclear weapons under Article H of that treaty. As a non-signatory to the NPT, however, India has never been under a conventional international law obligation to refrain from acquiring, or to give up its possession of nuclear arms. Yet an increasing number of scholars have argued that certain provisions of the NPT including the obligation set out in Article II, have become additionally binding in customary international law. If this is the case, India could find itself legally required to disarm its nuclear weapons, irrespective of the fact that it is not bound by the NPT directly. This article examines whether the prohibition on the possession of nuclear arms for all but the officially sanctioned NPT nuclear powers has indeed taken on a customary international law status. It is argued that this is probably not the case, though it is true that a credible argument can be made in support of the existence of such a customary norm. However, it is contended that even if NPT Article II does have additional binding force in custom, India has acquired the status of a 'persistent objector' state and thus nonetheless retains its legal right to possess nuclear weapons.
Recommended Citation
Green, James A.
(2012)
"India's Status as a Nuclear Weapons Power under Customary International Law,"
National Law School of India Review: Vol. 24:
Iss.
1, Article 17.
Available at:
https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol24/iss1/17
