Abstract
The last three decades have witnessed a sporadic rise in the transfer of the exclusive jurisdiction of our judiciary to administrative tribunals and other similar specialised adjudicatory fora. While this move, legitimised through a constitutional amendment, may have been presumptively benign and welfare oriented, it would distort the foundations of a well functioning institutional concurrence envisaged by our Constitution. Through this essay the author seek to clinically expose the constitutional and doctrinal infirmities in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 42nd Amendment. While agreeing with normative arguments in favour of 'tribunalisation', it argues that the manner and method in which an exclusive judicial function is transferred to tribunals must be such that 7udicial independence' is not compromised. On another level, this paper questions the Apex Court's view that Parliamentary competence to tribunalise is unfettered, implying that any aspect of judicial functioning can be transferred to these specialised fora. While critical of the Court's disregard towards key issues of controversy in Articles 323 A and B, this essay engages in a comprehensive analyses of tribunalisation from the standpoint of the ruling in R. Gandhi V. Union of India.
Recommended Citation
Swarup, Gautam
(2012)
"Indiscriminate Tribunalisation and the Exclusive Judicial Domain: An Analysis of the 42nd Amendment in the Light of Decisions of the Supreme Court,"
National Law School of India Review: Vol. 23:
Iss.
2, Article 7.
Available at:
https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol23/iss2/7
